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This paper presents an experimental study and the lessons 
learned from the observation of the attackers when logged on a 
compromised machine. The results are based on a six months 
period during which a controlled experiment has been run with 
a high interaction honeypot. We correlate our findings with 
those obtained with a worldwide distributed system of low-




During the last decade, several initiatives have been 
developed to monitor and collect real world data about 
malicious activities on the Internet, e.g., the Internet 
Motion Sensor project [1], CAIDA [2] and Dshield [3]. The 
CADHo project [4] in which we are involved is 
complementary to these initiatives and is aimed at: 
• deploying a distributed platform of honeypots [5] that 
gathers data suitable to analyze the attack processes 
targeting a large number of machines on the Internet; 
• validating the usefulness of this platform by carrying out 
various analyses, based on the collected data, to 
characterize the observed attacks and model their 
impact on security. 
A honeypot is a machine connected to a network but 
that no one is supposed to use. If a connection occurs, it 
must be, at best an accidental error or, more likely, an 
attempt to attack the machine.  
The first stage of the project focused on the 
deployment of a data collection environment (called 
Leurré.com [6]) based on low-interaction honeypots. As 
of today, around 40 honeypot platforms have been 
deployed at various sites from academia and industry in 
almost 30 different countries over the five continents. 
Several analyses and interesting conclusions have been 
derived based on the collected data as detailed e.g., in 
[4,5,7-9]. Nevertheless, with such honeypots, hackers can 
only scan ports and send requests to fake servers without 
ever succeeding in taking control over them. The second 
stage of our project is aimed at setting up and deploying 
high-interaction honeypots to allow us to analyze and 
model the behavior of malicious attackers once they have 
managed to compromise and get access to a new host, 
under strict control and monitoring. We are mainly 
interested in observing the progress of real attack 
processes and the activities carried out by the attackers in 
a controlled environment. 
In this paper, we describe the lessons learned from the 
development and deployment of such a honeypot. The 
main contributions are threefold. First, we do confirm the 
findings discussed in [9] showing that different sets of 
compromised machines are used to carry out the various 
stages of planned attacks. Second, we do outline the fact 
that, despite this apparent sophistication, the actors 
behind those actions do not seem to be extremely skillful, 
to say the least. Last, the geographical location of the 
machines involved in the last step of the attacks and the 
link with some phishing activities shed a geopolitical and 
socio-economical light on the results of our analysis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the architecture of our high-interaction honeypot and the 
design rationales for our solution. The lessons learned 
from the attacks observed over a period of almost 4.5 
months are discussed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 
concludes and discusses future work. An extended version 
of this paper detailing the context of this work and the 
related state-of-the art is available in [10]. 
 
2. Architecture of our honeypot 
 
In our implementation, we decided to use VMware [11] 
and to install virtual operating system upon it. Compared 
to solutions based on physical machines, virtual 
honeypots provide a cost effective and flexible solution 
that is well suited for running experiments to observe 
attacks.  
The objective of our experiment is to analyze the 
behavior of the attackers who succeed in breaking into a 
machine. The vulnerability that they exploit is not as 
crucial as the activity they carry out once they have broken 
into the host. That's why we chose to use a simple 
vulnerability: weak passwords for ssh user accounts. Our 
honeypot is not particularly hardened for two reasons. 
First, we are interested in analyzing the behavior of the 
attackers even when they exploit a buffer overflow and 
become root. So, if we use some kernel patch such as Pax 
[12], our system will be more secure but it will be 
impossible to observe some behavior. Secondly, if the 
system is too hardened, the intruders may suspect 
something abnormal and then give up. 
In our setup, only ssh connections to the virtual host 
are authorized so that the attacker can exploit this 
vulnerability. A firewall blocks all connection attempts 
from the Internet, but those to port 22 (ssh). Also, any 
connection from the virtual host to the outside is blocked 
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to avoid that intruders attack remote machines from the 
honeypot. This does not prevent the intruder from 
downloading code, using the ssh connection1. 
Our honeypot is a standard Gnu/Linux installation, 
with kernel 2.6, with the usual binary tools. No additional 
software was installed except the http apache server. 
This kernel was modified as explained in the next 
subsection. The real host executing VMware uses the 
same Gnu/Linux distribution and is isolated from outside. 
In order to log what the intruders do on the honeypot, 
we modified some drivers functions (tty_read and 
tty_write), as well as the exec system call in the Linux 
kernel. The modifications of tty_read and tty_write 
enable us to intercept the activity on all the terminals of 
the system. The modification of the exec system call 
enables us to record the system calls used by the intruder.  
These functions are modified in such a way that the 
captured information is logged directly into a buffer of the 
kernel memory of the honeypot itself. 
Moreover, in order to record all the logins and 
passwords tried by the attackers to break into the 
honeypot we added a new system call into the kernel of 
the virtual operating system and we modified the source 
code of the ssh server so that it uses this new system call. 
The logins and passwords are logged in the kernel 
memory, in the same buffer as the information related to 
the commands used by the attackers. 
The activities of the intruder logged by the honeypot 
are preprocessed and then stored into an SQL database. 
The raw data are automatically processed to extract 
relevant information for further analyses, mainly: i) the IP 
address of the attacking machine, ii) the login and the 
password tested, iii) the date of the connection, iv) the 
terminal associated (tty) to each connection, and v) each 
command used by the attacker. 
 
3. Experimental results 
 
This section presents the results of our experiments. 
First, we give global statistics in order to give an overview 
of the activities observed on the honeypot, then we 
characterize the various intrusion processes. Finally, we 
analyze in detail the behavior of the attackers once they 
break into the honeypot. In this paper, an intrusion 
corresponds to the activities carried out by an intruder 
who has succeeded to break into the system. 
 
3.1. Global statistics 
 
The high-interaction honeypot has been deployed on 
the Internet and has been running for 131 days during 
which 480 IP addresses have tried to contact its ssh port.  
It is worth comparing this value to the amount of hits 
observed against port 22, considering all the other low-
interaction honeypot platforms we have deployed in the 
rest of the world (40 platforms). In the average, each 
platform has received hits on port 22 from around 
approximately 100 different IPs during the same period of 
time. Only four platforms have been contacted by more 
                                                           
1 We have sometimes authorized http connections for a short time, by 
checking that the attackers were not trying to attack other remote hosts. 
than 300 different IP addresses on that port and only one 
was hit by more visitors than our high interaction 
honeypot. Even better, the low-interaction platform 
maintained in the same subnet as the high-interaction 
honeypot experimented only 298 visits, i.e. less than two 
thirds of what the high-interaction did see. This very 
simple and first observation confirms the fact already 
described in [9] that some attacks are driven by the fact 
that attackers know in advance, thanks to scans done by 
other machines, where potentially vulnerable services are 
running. The existence of such a service on a machine will 
trigger more attacks against it. This is what we observe 
here: the low interaction machines do not have the ssh 
service open, as opposed to the high interaction one, and, 
therefore get less attacked than the one where some target 
has been identified. 
The number of ssh connection attempts to the 
honeypot we have recorded is 248717 (we do not consider 
here the scans on the ssh port). This represents about 
1900 connection attempts a day. Among these 248717 
connection attempts, only 344 were successful. Table 1 
represents the user accounts that were mostly tried (the 
top ten) as well as the number of different passwords that 
have been tested by the attackers. It is noteworthy that 
many user accounts corresponding to usual first names 
have also regularly been tested on our honeypot. The total 
number of accounts tested is 41530. 
 









root 34251 13.77% 12027 
admin 4007 1.61% 1425 
test 3109 1.25% 561 
user 1247 0.50% 267 
guest 1128 0.45% 201 
info 886 0.36% 203 
mysql 870 0.35% 211 
oracle 857 0.34% 226 
postgres 834 0.33% 194 
webmaster 728 0.29% 170 
Table 1: ssh connection attempts and number of 
passwords tested 
Before the real beginning of the experiment 
(approximately one and a half month), we had deployed a 
machine with a ssh server correctly configured, offering 
no weak account and password. We have taken advantage 
of this observation period to determine which accounts 
were mostly tried by automated scripts. Using this 
acquired knowledge, we have created 17 user accounts and 
we have started looking for successful intrusions. Some of 
the created accounts were among the most attacked ones 
and others not. As we already explained in the paper, we 
have deliberately created user accounts with weak 
passwords (except for the root account). Then, we have 
measured the time between the creation of the account 
and the first successful connection to this account, then 
the duration between the first successful connection and 
the first real intrusion (as explained in section 3.2, the 
first successful connection is very seldom a real intrusion 
but rather an automatic script which tests passwords). 
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creation and first 
successful connection 
Duration between first 
successful connection 
and first intrusion 
UA1 1 day 4 days 
UA2 Half a day 4 minutes 
UA3 15 days 1 day 
UA4 5 days 10 days 
UA5 5 days null 
UA6 1 day 4 days 
UA7 5 days 8 days 
UA8 1 day 9 days 
UA9 1 day 12 days 
UA10 3 days 2 minutes 
UA11 7 days 4 days 
UA12 1 day 8 days 
UA13 5 days 17 days 
UA14 5 days 13 days 
UA15 9 days 7 days 
UA16 1 day 14 days 
UA17 1 day 12 days 
Table 2: History of breaking accounts 
 
The second column indicates that there is usually a gap 
of several days between the time when a weak password is 
found and the time when someone logs into the system 
with this password to issue some commands on the now 
compromised host. This is a somehow a surprising fact 
and is described with some more details here below. The 
particular case of the UA5 account is explained as follows: 
an intruder succeeded in breaking the UA4 account. This 
intruder looked at the contents of the /etc/passwd file in 
order to see the list of user accounts for this machine. He 
immediately decided to try to break the UA5 account and 
he was successful. Thus, for this account, the first 
successful connection is also the first intrusion. 
 
3.2. Intrusion process 
 
In the section, we present the conclusions of our 
analyses regarding the process to exploit the weak 
password vulnerability of our honeypot. The observed 
attack activities can be grouped into three main 
categories: 1) dictionary attacks, 2) interactive intrusions, 
3) other activities such as scanning, etc. 
 
Figure 3: Classification of observed IP addresses 
As illustrated in figure 3, among the 480 IP addresses 
that were seen on the honeypot, 197 performed dictionary 
attacks and 35 performed real intrusions on the honeypot 
(see below for details). The 248 IP addresses left were 
used for scanning activity or activity that we did not 
clearly identified. Among the 197 IP addresses that made 
dictionary attacks, 18 succeeded in finding passwords. 
The others (179) did not find the passwords either because 
their dictionary did not include the accounts we created or 
because the corresponding weak password had already 
been changed by a previous intruder. We have also 
represented in Figure 3 the corresponding number of IP 
addresses that were also seen on the low-interaction 
honeypot deployed in the context of the project in the 
same network (between brackets). Whereas most of the IP 
addresses seen on the high interaction honeypot are also 
observed on the low interaction honeypot, none of the 35 
IPs used to really log into our machine to launch 
commands have ever been observed on any of the low 
interaction honeypots that we do control in the whole 
world! This striking result is discussed hereafter. 
 
3.2.1. Dictionary attack. The preliminary step of 
the intrusion consists in dictionary attacks2. In general, it 
takes only a couple of days for newly created accounts to 
be compromised. As shown in Figure 3, these attacks have 
been launched from 197 IP addresses. By analysing more 
precisely the duration between the different ssh 
connection attempts from the same attacking machine, we 
can say that these dictionary attacks are executed by 
automatic scripts. As a matter of fact, we have noted that 
these attacking machines try several hundreds, even 
several thousands of accounts in a very short time. 
We have made then further analyses regarding the 
machines that succeed in finding passwords, i.e., the 18 IP 
addresses. By searching the leurré.com database 
containing information about the activities of these 
addresses against the other low interaction honeypots we 
found four important elements of information. First, we 
note that none of our low interaction honeypot has an ssh 
server running, none of them replies to requests sent to 
port 22. These machines are thus scanning machines 
without any prior knowledge on their open ports. Second, 
we found evidences that these IPs were scanning in a 
simple sequential way all addresses to be found in a block 
of addresses. Moreover, the comparison of the 
fingerprints left on our low interaction honeypots 
highlights the fact that these machines are running tools 
behaving the same way, not to say the same tool. Third, 
these machines are only interested in port 22, they have 
never been seen connecting to other ports. Fourth, there is 
no apparent correlation as far as their geographical 
location is concerned: they are located all over the world. 
In other words, it comes from this analysis that these 
IPs are used to run a well known program. The detailed 
analysis of this specific tool is outside the scope of the 
paper but, nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the 
activities linked to that tool, as observed in our 
Leurré.com database, indicate that it is unlikely to be a 
worm but rather an easy to use and widely spread tool. 
 
3.2.2. Interactive attack: intrusion. The second 
step of the attack consists in the real intrusion. We have 
noted that, several days after the guessing of a weak 
                                                           
2 We consider as “dictionary attack” any attack that tries more than 10 
different accounts and passwords. 
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password, an interactive ssh connection is executed on 
our honeypot to issue several commands. We believe that, 
in those situations, a real human being, as opposed to an 
automated script, is connected to our machine. This is 
explained and justified in Section 4.3. As shown in Figure 
3, these intrusions come from 35 IP addresses never 
observed on any of the low-interaction honeypots. 
Whereas the geographic localisation of the machines 
performing dictionary attacks is very blur, the machines 
that are used by a human being for the interactive ssh 
connection are, most of the time, clearly identified. We 
have a precise idea of their country, geographic address, 
the responsible of the corresponding domain. 
Surprisingly, these machines, for half of them, come from 
the same country, an European country not usually seen 
as one of the most attacking ones as reported, for 
instance, by the www.leurrecom.org web site. 
We then made analyses in order to see if these IP 
addresses had tried to connect to other ports of our 
honeypot except for these interactive connections; and the 
answer is no. Furthermore, the machines that make 
interactive ssh connections on our honeypot do not make 
any other kind of connections on this honeypot, i.e, no 
scan or dictionary attack. Further analyses, using the data 
collected from the low-interaction honeypots deployed in 
the CADHo project, revealed that none of the 35 IP 
addresses have ever been observed on any of our 
platforms deployed in the word. This is interesting 
because it shows that these machines are totally dedicated 
to this kind of attack (they only targeted our high-
interaction honeypot and only when they knew at least 
one login and password on this machine). 
We can conclude for these analyses that we face two 
groups of attacking machines. The first group is composed 
of machines that are specifically in charge of making 
dictionary attacks. Then the results of these dictionary 
attacks are published somewhere. Then, another group of 
machines, which has no intersection with the first group, 
comes to exploit the weak passwords discovered by the 
first group. This second group of machines is, as far as we 
can see, clearly geographically identified and commands 
are executed by a human being. A similar two steps 
process was already observed in the CADHo project when 
analyzing the data collected from the low-interaction 
honeypots (see [9] for more details). 
 
3.3. Behavior of attackers 
 
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the behavior 
of the intruders. We first characterize the intruders, i.e. 
we try to know if they are humans or programs. Then, we 
present in more details the various actions they have 
carried out on the honeypot. Finally, we try to figure out 
what their skill level seems to be. 
We concentrate the analyses on the last three months 
of our experiment. During this period, some intruders 
have visited our honeypot only once, others have visited it 
several times, for a total of 38 ssh intrusions. These 
intrusions were initiated from 16 IP addresses and 7 
accounts were used. Table 3 presents the number of 
intrusions per account, IP addresses and passwords used 
for these intrusions. It is of course difficult to be sure that 
all the intrusions for a same account are initiated by the 
same person. Nevertheless, in our case, we noted that: 
• most of the time, after his first login, the attacker 
changes the weak password into a strong which, from 
there on, remains unchanged. 
• when two different IP addresses access the same 
account (with the same password), they are very close 
and belong to the same country or company.  
These two remarks lead us to believe that there is in 
general only one person associated to the intrusions for a 
particular account. 
 




Number of IP 
addresses 
UA2 1 1 1 
UA4 13 2 2 
UA5 1 1 1 
UA8 1 1 1 
UA10 9 2 2 
UA13 6 1 5 
UA16 5 1 3 
UA17 2 1 1 
Table 3: Number of intrusions per account 
 
3.3.1. Type of the attackers: humans or 
programs. Before analyzing what intruders do when 
connected, we can try to identify who they are. They can 
be of two different natures. Either they are humans, or 
they are programs which reproduce simple behaviors. For 
all intrusions but 12, intruders have made mistakes when 
typing commands. Mistakes are identified when the 
intruder uses the backspace to erase a previously entered 
character. So, it is very likely that such activities are 
carried out by a human, rather than programs. 
When an intruder did not make any mistake, we 
analyzed how the data were transmitted from the attacker 
machine to the honeypot. We can note that, for ssh 
communications, data transmission between the client 
and the server is asynchronous. Most of the time, the ssh 
client implementation uses the function select() to get 
user input. So, when the user presses a key, this function 
ends and the program sends the corresponding value to 
the server. In the case of a copy and a paste into the 
terminal running the client, the select() function also 
ends, but the program sends all the values contained in 
the buffer used for the paste into the server. We can 
assume that, when tty_read() returns more than one 
character, these values have been sent after a copy and a 
paste. If all the activities during a connection are due to a 
copy and a paste, we can strongly assume that it is due to 
an automatic script. Otherwise, this is quite likely a 
human being who uses shortcuts from time to time (such 
as CTRL-V to paste commands into its ssh session). For 7 
out of the last 12 activities without mistakes, intruders 
have entered several commands on a character-by-
character basis. This, once again, seems to indicate that a 
human being is entering the commands. For the 5 others, 
their activities are not significant enough to conclude: 
they have only launched a single command, like w, which 
is not long enough to highlight a copy and a paste. 
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3.3.2. Attacker activities. The first significant 
remark is that all of the intruders change the password of 
the hacked account. The second remark is that most of 
them start by downloading some files. In all cases, but 
one, the attackers tried to download some malware to the 
compromised machines. In a single case, the attacker has 
first tried to download an innocuous, yet large, file to the 
machine (the binary for a driver coming from a known 
web site). This is probably a simple way to assess the 
connectivity quality of the compromised host. 
The command used by the intruders to download the 
software is wget. To be more precise, 21 intrusions upon 
38 include the wget command. These 21 intrusions 
concern all the hacked accounts.  As mentioned in 
section 2, outgoing http connections are forbidden by the 
firewall. Nevertheless, the intruders still have the 
possibility to download files through the ssh connection 
using sftp command (instead of wget). Surprisingly, we 
noted that only 30% of the intruders did use this ssh 
connection. 70% of the attackers were unable to download 
their malware due to the absence of http connectivity! 
Three explanations can be envisaged at this stage. First, 
they follow some simplistic cookbook and do not even 
known the other methods at their disposal to upload a file. 
Second, the machines where the malware resides do not 
support sftp. Third, the lack of http connectivity made 
the attacker suspicious and he decided to leave our 
system. Surprisingly, the first explanation seems to be the 
right one in our case as we noticed that the attackers leave 
after an unsuccessful wget and come back a few hours or 
days later, trying the same command again as if they were 
hoping it to work at that time. Some of them have been 
seen trying this several times. It can be concluded that:  
i) they are apparently unable to understand why the 
command fails, ii) they are not afraid to come back to the 
machine despite the lack of http connectivity,  
iii) applying such brute force attack reveals that they are 
not aware of any other method to upload the file. 
Once the attackers manage to download their malware 
using sftp, they try to install it (by decompressing or 
extracting files for example). 75% of the intrusions that 
installed software did not install it on the hacked account 
but rather on standard directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp 
or /dev/shm (which are directories with write access for 
everybody). This makes the hacker activity more difficult 
to identify because these directories are regularly used by 
the operating system itself and shared by all the users. 
Additionally, we have identified four main activities of 
the intruders. The first one is launching ssh scans on 
other networks but these scans have never tested local 
machines. Their idea is to use the targeted machine to 
scan other networks, so that it is more difficult for the 
administrator of the targeted network to localize them. 
The program used by most intruders, which is easy to find 
on the Internet, is pscan.c. 
The second type of activity consists in launching irc 
clients, e.g., emech [13] and psyBNC. Names of binary files 
have regularly been changed by intruders, probably in 
order to hide them. For example, the binary files of emech 
have been changed to crond or inetd, which are well 
known Unix binary file names and processes. 
The third type of activity is trying to become root. 
Surprisingly, such attempts have been observed for 3 
intrusions only. Two rootkits were used. The first one 
exploits two vulnerabilities: a vulnerability which 
concerns the Linux kernel memory management code of 
the mremap system call [14] and a vulnerability which 
concerns the internal kernel function used to manage 
process's memory heap [15]. This exploit could not 
succeed because the kernel version of our honeypot does 
not correspond to the version of the exploit. The intruder 
should have realized this because he checked the version 
of the kernel of the honeypot (uname -a). However, he 
launched this rootkit anyway and failed. The other rootkit 
used by intruders exploits a vulnerability in the program 
ld. Thanks to this exploit, three intruders became root 
but the buffer overflow succeeded only partially. Even if 
they apparently became root, they could not launch all 
desired programs (removing files for example caused 
access control errors). 
The last activity observed in the honeypot is related to 
phishing activities. It is difficult to make precise 
conclusions because only one intruder has attempted to 
launch such an attack. He downloaded a forged email and 
tried to send it through the local smtp agent. But, as far as 
we could understand, it looked like a preliminary step of 
the attack because the list of recipient emails was very 
short. It seems that is was just a preliminary test before 
the real deployment of the attack. 
 
3.3.3. Attackers skill. Intruders can roughly 
speaking be classified into two main categories. The most 
important one is relative to script kiddies. They are 
inexperienced hackers who use programs found on the 
Internet without really understanding how they work. The 
next category represents intruders who are more 
dangerous. They are named “black hat”. They can make 
serious damage on systems because they are expert in 
security and they know how to exploit vulnerabilities on 
various systems. 
As already presented in §3.3.2. (use of wget and sftp), 
we have observed that intruders are not as clever as 
expected. For example, for two hacked accounts, the 
intruders don't seem to really understand the Unix file 
access rights (it's very obvious for example when they try 
to erase some files whereas they don't have the required 
privileges). For these two same accounts, the intruders 
also try to kill the processes of other users. Many 
intruders do not try to delete the file containing the 
history of their commands or do not try to deactivate this 
history function (this file depends on the login shell used, 
it is .bash_history for example for the bash). Among the 
38 intrusions, only 14 were cleaned by the intruders (11 
have deactivated the history function and 3 have deleted 
the.bash_history file). This means that 24 intrusions left 
behind them a perfectly readable summary of their 
activity within the honeypot. 
The IP address of the honeypot is private and we have 
started another honeypot on this network. This second 
honeypot is not directly accessible from the outside, it is 
only accessible from the first honeypot. We have modified 
the /etc/motd file of the first honeypot (which is 
automatically printed on the screen during the login 
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process) and added the following message: “In order to 
use the software XXX, please connect to A.B.C.D”. 
In spite of this message, only one intruder has tried to 
connect to the second honeypot. We could expect that an 
experienced hacker will try to use this information. In a 
more general way, we have very seldom seen an intruder 
looking for other active machines on the same network. 
One important thing to note is relative to 
fingerprinting activity. No intruder has tried to check the 
presence of VMware software. For three hacked accounts, 
the intruders have read the contents of the file 
/proc/cpuinfo but that's all. None of the methods 
discussed on Internet was tested to identify the presence 
of VMware software [16,17]. This probably means that the 




In this paper, we have presented the results of an 
experiment carried out over a period of 6 months during 
which we have observed the various steps that lead an 
attacker to successfully break into a vulnerable machine 
and his behavior once he has managed to take control 
over the machine. 
The findings are somehow consistent with the informal 
know how shared by security experts. The contributions of 
the paper reside in performing an experiment and 
rigorous analyses that confirm some of these informal 
assumptions. Also, the precise analysis of the observed 
attacks reveals several interesting facts. First of all, the 
complementarity between high and low interaction 
honeypots is highlighted as some explanations can be 
found by combining information coming from both set 
ups. Second, it appears that most of the observed attacks 
against port 22 were only partially automated and carried 
out by script kiddies. This is very different from what can 
be observed against other ports, such as 445, 139 and 
others, where worms have been designed to completely 
carry out the tasks required for the infection and 
propagation. Last, honeypot fingerprinting does not seem 
to be a high priority for attackers as none of them has 
tried the known techniques to check if they were under 
observation. It is also worth mentioning a couple of 
important missing observations. First, we did not observe 
scanners detecting the presence of the open ssh port and 
providing this information to other machines in charge of 
running the dictionary attack. This is different from 
previous observations reported in [9]. Second, as most of 
the attacks follow very simple and repetitive patterns, we 
did not observe anything that could be used to derive 
sophisticated scenarios of attacks that could be analyzed 
by intrusion detection correlation engine. Of course, at 
this stage it is too early to derive definite conclusions from 
this observation. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to keep doing this 
experiment over a longer period of time to see if things do 
change, for instance if a more efficient automation takes 
place. We would have to solve the problem of weak 
passwords being replaced by strong ones though, in order 
to see more people succeeding in breaking into the 
system. Also, it would be worth running the same 
experiment by opening another vulnerability into the 
system and verifying if the identified steps remain the 
same, if the types of attackers are similar. Could it be, at 
the contrary, that some ports are preferably chosen by 
script kiddies while others are reserved to some more elite 
attackers? This is something that we are in the process of 
assessing. 
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